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This was a rare claim of equal pay brought under the ‘orthodox’ discrimination regime 
(as religious discrimination), rather than the established equal pay regime (confined to 
male-female comparisons). The case was also notable for the continuing attempt by the 
Court of Appeal to establish a new ‘reason why’ theory of indirect discrimination, and 
the EAT’s ‘schoolboy error’ over the comparison required. Sense and orthodoxy was 
restored by 48 crisp paragraphs provided by Lady Hale in the Supreme Court. But, the 
Court of Appeal’s questionable interpretation of a raft of Equal Pay precedents was left 
unaddressed. 
In Naeem, Muslim prison chaplains were paid less than Christian ones. There were 
two standout reasons for this: first, a length of service pay criterion, and second, no 
Muslim chaplains were employed before 2002. Hence, Muslim chaplains tended to have 
a shorter length of service and registered lower on the pay scale. Using significant statistic as 
evidence, a Muslim chaplain made a claim of indirect (religious) discrimination under the 
Equality Act 2010, section 19.  
Section 19(1) provides that an employer discriminates if it applies a provision, 
criterion or practice (PCP) that ‘puts’ the claimant, and those sharing his/her protected 
characteristic, at a ‘particular disadvantage’ when compared with those not sharing the 
protected characteristic. If the claimant establishes this prima facie case, the burden shifts to 
the employer to show that the challenged practice is objectively justified.  
The case history 
The employment tribunal, the EAT and Court of Appeal each rejected Naeem’s claim, albeit 
for different reasons. At first instance, the tribunal held that ‘the claimant need not show why 
the PCP put him at a disadvantage, but whether it does’ (see [2016] ICR 289 (CA) [31]). 
Thus, the bare facts were enough to establish the prima facie case. But the claim failed 
because the employer objectively justified the practice. In the EAT and the Court of Appeal, 
the case fell at the prima facie stage, but for different reasons. For the EAT, the case 
foundered on the comparison. For the Court of Appeal, the case centred on another 
element of indirect discrimination, the cause of the disparity, which was held not to be the 
pay scale. The Supreme Court overruled the EAT and Court of Appeal findings, but restored 
 the employment tribunal’s decision in full. 
The Correct Pool for the comparison 
Section 23(1) of the Equality Act 2010 provides that for a comparison under 19, ‘there must 
be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case.’ The EAT held 
that a ‘like-for-like’ comparison could not include chaplains employed before 2002, as that 
would be a ‘material difference’ between the groups (see [2016] ICR 289 [31]). The 
‘schoolboy error’ here was defining the pool for comparison by the length-of-service criteria 
of the pay scale, a challenged factor. Reciting the principle that ‘the pool should not be so 
drawn as to incorporate the disputed condition’, Lay Hale rejected this. Instead, ‘all the 
workers affected by the PCP in question should be considered’ ([40]-[41]). Only by including 
all chaplains in the pool, could the comparative effects of the pay scale on Muslim and non-
Muslim chaplains be assessed.  
The relevance of Essop v Home Office 
Given that the Court of Appeal’s decision was rooted in the reason why theory, it was no 
surprise that in his leading judgment, Underhill LJ cited the Court’s first offering of the notion, 
Essop v Home Office [2015] ICR 1063 (also overturned [2017] UKSC 27). Here, it was not 
enough that an employer’s challenged practice put the claimant’s group (and the claimant) at a 
disadvantage. Now, the claimant had to show why this was, for instance, by explaining why a 
disproportionate number of black and ethnic minority candidates failed a promotion exam, and 
why each claimant had failed. 
At first blush, citing Essop seems inappropriate. The Court in Essop wanted to know 
the precise cause of the disparity: the reason why. One might suppose in a case where the 
precise reason was known, such as the length of service criterion, Essop would have no 
application. But for Underhill LJ, Essop established that ‘it is permissible to consider the reason 
for the disparity complained of, in the sense of the factors which caused it to occur’ ([30]); this 
tallied with section 19’s requirement that the challenged practice ‘puts’ the claimant’s group at 
a disadvantage: ‘The concept of “putting” persons at a disadvantage is causal, and, as in any 
legal analysis of causation, it is necessary to distinguish the legally relevant cause or causes 
from other factors in the situation ([22]).’ 
Thus, it was open to the employer ‘to go behind the bare fact that Muslim and Christian 
chaplains have different lengths of service and seek to establish the reason why that was so’. 
Allied to his reasoning, Underhill LJ contrasted Naeem’s case with ‘conventional’ equal pay 
cases where ‘a length of service criterion had an inherent tendency to put women at a 
disadvantage because women are liable to start their careers later than men and/or to take career 
breaks because of family and childcare responsibilities’ ([24]). Upon this, Underhill LJ 
concluded, ‘In my view the only material cause of the disparity in remuneration relied on by 
the claimant is the (on average) more recent start-dates of the Muslim chaplains’ ([22]). 
Lady Hale stated simply, ‘this cannot be right’. Noting that ‘The same could be said of 
almost any reason why a PCP puts one group at a disadvantage,’ she too invoked the parallel 
equal pay scenarios where length of service benefits disadvantaged women, but for her, there 
‘is nothing peculiar to womanhood in taking the larger share of caring responsibilities in a 
family’ ([39]). She might have added that by suggesting that there was nothing inherent in the 
pay scale that disadvantaged Muslims as Muslims, Underhill LJ confused direct and indirect 
discrimination. 
The Equal Pay precedents 
In support of the decision, Underhill LJ drew upon a raft of Equal Pay cases. He cited Glasgow 
CC v Marshall [2000] ICR 196 (HL) to verify a notion that the claimant had to show sex 
discrimination to establish the prima facie case. In Marshall, Lord Nicholls had said, ‘if the 
employer proves the absence of sex discrimination he is not obliged to justify the pay disparity’ 
(203). This was intended to demonstrate that Naeem’s employer could defeat his prima facie 
case by pointing to a non-discriminatory cause of the pay disparity, presumably, the later 
recruitment. In the context of the equal pay legislative regime at the time (Equal Pay Act 1970), 
where the concepts of direct and indirect discrimination were not explicit, Marshall simply 
held that a single-comparator, or ‘direct discrimination’, claim can be defeated by showing 
(with statistics) that the lower pay was not because of sex. In Marshall seven female instructors 
compared themselves with a male teacher (teachers were paid more). At the same time, a male 
instructor compared himself with a female teacher. However, there was no sex disparity 
between the two groups, with females making up about 96-97 per cent of each occupation. 
Hence, this was a mere ‘fair pay’ claim. If the claims had been expressed as indirect 
discrimination, they would have failed for want of a disparity. 
With a blind eye to this, Underhill LJ went on to cite more recent Court of Appeal 
authority. In Armstrong v Newcastle upon Tyne NHS [2006] IRLR 124, it was suggested that 
the ‘Marshall defence’ applied to indirect discrimination. For Underhill LJ, ‘the point was put 
beyond doubt’([27]) in Gibson v Sheffield CC [2010] ICR 708 (CA). In fact, in Gibson, only 
Maurice Kay LJ fully endorsed Armstrong [75]. Pill LJ dissented on the point [49], while Smith 
LJ offered only a heavily qualified approval [68], and highlighted the ‘mistake’ below of 
confusing indirect with direct discrimination ([58], [69]-[70]), a mistake resurrected by 
Underhill’s judgment. Moreover, Gibson refused to follow Armstrong and allowed the 
claimant’s appeal. Overshadowing all of this is Enderby v Frenchay Case C-127/92, where the 
ECJ held that significant statistics will produce an irrebuttable presumption of discrimination 
for the employer to objectively justify. Underhill LJ did not discuss Enderby, a case which 
completely undermines his interpretation of equal pay case law. 
Although it is implicit from her judgment that Underhill LJ misinterpreted the equal 
pay cases, Lady Hale did not address this expressly. 
Summary 
With a brevity to suggest distain for the (appellate) decisions below, the Supreme Court 
restored the law of indirect discrimination to its previous understanding. Rather than engage 
with each and every detail of its logic, this was perhaps the best way to deal with the convoluted 
reasoning: Lady Hale’s speech focussed on what the law should be. But it would have been 
helpful for the law of equal pay if her judgment made it clear that the Enderby principle 
prevailed, or better still, if it had addressed the confusion produced by Armstrong and its 
dalliance with the ‘Marshall defence’. As such, this has left the door ajar for a so-minded judge 
to mount another assault on equal pay law. 
